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Abstract
One of the most popular abstraction used in security analysis uses abstract, symbolic terms to model the
bit strings sent over the network. However, the high level of abstraction blurs the signiﬁcance of proofs
carried out in such models with respect to real executions. In particular, although good encryption functions
are randomized, most existing symbolic models for security do not capture explicitly the randomization of
ciphertexts.
On the other hand, recent results relating symbolic models with cryptographic models require symbolic
models where the randomization of ciphertexts is captured explicitly (through the use of labels attached
to symbolic ciphertexts). Since little to no tool support exists for the resulting label-based models it may
seem necessary to extend the decision procedures and the implementation of existing tools from the simpler
models to the models that use labels.
In this paper we put forth a more practical alternative. We show that for a large class of security properties
(that includes rather standard formulations of secrecy and authenticity), security of protocols with respect
to the simpler model implies security in the model that uses labels. Combined with the computational
soundness result of [4], our theorem enables the translation of security results obtained in symbolic mod-
els that do not use labels to standard computational security. Based on these results, we have recently
implemented an AVISPA module for verifying security properties in a standard cryptographic model.
Keywords: Probabilistic encryption, security models, protocol veriﬁcation, secrecy, authentication.
1 Introduction
Designers of mathematical models for computational systems need to ﬁnd appropri-
ate trade-oﬀs between two seemingly contradictory requirements. Automatic veri-
ﬁcation (and thus usability) typically requires a high level of abstraction whereas
prediction accuracy requires a high level of details. From this perspective, the use
of symbolic models for security analysis is particularly delicate since it seems that
the inherent high level of abstraction at which such models operate is not able
to capture all aspects that are relevant to security. This paper is concerned with
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one particular such aspect, namely the use of randomization in the construction of
cryptosystems [5].
A central feature of the computational, complexity-based models is the ability to
capture and reason explicitly about the use of randomness. Moreover, randomness
is essential to achieve any meaningful notion of security for encryption. In contrast,
symbolic models rarely represent randomness directly. For example, a typical rep-
resentation for the encryption of message m under the public key of entity B is
the term {m}ek(B). Notice that the symbolic representation does not capture the
dependency on the randomness used to generate this ciphertext. While this ab-
straction may be suﬃciently accurate in certain settings [11], in some other settings
it is not suﬃcient.
Consider the following ﬂow in some toy protocol:
A → B : {m}ek(B), {{m}ek(B)}ek(B)
To implement this ﬂow, each occurrence of {m}ek(B) is mapped to a ciphertext. No-
tice however that the pictorial description does not specify if the two occurrences of
{m}ek(B) are equal (created with identical randomness) or diﬀerent (created with
diﬀerent randomness). In rich enough protocol speciﬁcation languages disambiguat-
ing constructs as above can be easily done. For instance, in a language that has
explicit assignments, the two diﬀerent interpretation for the ﬁrst message of the
protocol can be obtained as
x := {m}ek(B); send(x, {x}ek(B)) and send({m}ek(B), {{m}ek(B)}ek(B)).
Here, each distinct occurrence of {m}ek(B) is interpreted with diﬀerent randomness.
Other approaches adopt a more direct solution and represent the randomness used
for encryption explicitly [6, 1, 10, 4]. If we write {m}l
ek(B) for the encryption of m
under the public key of B with randomness l, the two diﬀerent interpretations of
the ﬂow are:
send({m}l1
ek(B), {{m}
l1
ek(B)}
l2
ek(B)) and send({m}
l1
ek(B), {{m}
l2
ek(B)}
l3
ek(B))
A model that employs labels to capture the randomness used in ciphertexts (and
signatures) has recently been used to establish soundness of symbolic analysis with
respect to computational models [4]. Their results are based on an emulation lemma:
for protocol executions, every computational trace can be mapped to a valid sym-
bolic trace. The mapping is then used to translate security properties that hold
in the symbolic model to computational analogues. Note that the use of labels is
necessary even when there is no explicit repetition of cyphertexts to distinguish for
example the encrypted messages generated by the agents from those generated by
the adversary.
The next step towards making the soundness result relevant to practice is to
carry out the security proofs using some (semi-)automated tools for the symbolic
model. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the popular tools (ProVerif [3],
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CASPER [8], Athena [13], AVISPA [2]), oﬀers capabilities for automatically reason-
ing in models that use labels. There are at least two solutions to this problem. One
possibility is to enhance the symbolic models that underlie existing tools. Unfor-
tunately such a modiﬁcation would probably require signiﬁcant eﬀort that involves
adapting existing decision procedures, proving their correctness, and verifying and
modifying thousands of lines of code.
In this paper we put forth and clarify an alternative solution, used implicitly
in [4]. The idea is to keep existing tools unchanged, use their underlying (unla-
beled) model to prove security properties, and then show that the results are in
fact meaningful for the model with labels. The main result of this paper is to prove
that for a large class of security properties the approach that we propose is indeed
feasible.
Results.
We consider the protocol speciﬁcation language and the execution model de-
veloped in [4]. The language is for protocols that use random nonces, public key
encryption and digital signatures, and uses labels to model the randomness used by
these primitives. To each protocol Π with labels, we naturally associate a protocol
Π obtained by erasing all labels, and extend the transformation to execution traces.
To each trace tr of Π we associate a trace tr obtained by erasing labels and we
extend this mapping to sets of traces. The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is a proof
that the transformation is sound. More precisely we prove that if tr is a valid trace
of Π (obtained by Dolev-Yao operations) then tr is a valid trace of Π. Importantly,
this result relies on the fact that the speciﬁcation language that we consider does
not allow equality tests between ciphertexts. We believe that a similar result holds
for most (if not all) protocol speciﬁcation languages that satisfy the above condi-
tion. The language for specifying protocols (with and without labels) as well as the
relation between their associated execution models are in Section 2.
In Section 3 we give two logics, Ll1 and L1, that we use to express security prop-
erties for protocols with and without labels, respectively. Informally, the formulas
of L1 are obtained by removing the labels from formulas of L
l
1. Both logics are
quite expressive. For example, it can be used to express standard formulations for
secrecy and authenticity properties.
Next we focus our attention on translating security properties between the two
models. First, notice that the mapping between the model with and that without
labels is not faithful since it looses information regarding inequality of ciphertexts.
To formalize this intuition we give a protocol Π and a formula φ such that Π satisﬁes
φ (the formula that corresponds to φ in the model without labels), but for which Π
does not satisfy φ. Anticipating, our example indicates that the source of problems
is that φ may contain equality tests between ciphertexts, and such tests may not
be translated faithfully. The counterexample is in Section 4.
The main result of the paper is a soundness theorem. We show that for a large
class of security properties it is possible to carry out the proof in the model without
labels and infer security properties in the model with labels. More precisely, we
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identify Ll2 and L2, fragments of L
l
1 and L1 respectively, such that the following
theorem holds.
Consider an arbitrary protocol Π and formula φ in Ll2. Let φ be a formula in
L2 obtained by erasing the labels that occur in φ. Then, it holds that:
Π |= φ =⇒ Π |= φ
The logics Ll2 and L2 are still expressive enough to contain the secrecy and authen-
tication formulas. The theorem and its proof are in Section 4.
Based on our result, we implemented an AVISPA module [2] that is used to
obtain computationally sound automatic proofs and used it to validate the protocols
in the AVISPA library. The results of our experiments are described in Section 5.
2 Protocol
In this section we provide the syntax of protocols with labels. The presentation is
adapted from [4]. The speciﬁcation language is similar to the one of Casrul [12]; it
allows parties to exchange messages built from identities and randomly generated
nonces using public key encryption and digital signatures. Protocols that do not
use labels are obtained straightforwardly.
2.1 Syntax
Consider an algebraic signature Σ with the following sorts. A sort ID for agent
identities, sorts SKey,VKey,EKey,DKey containing keys for signing, verifying, en-
cryption, and decryption respectively. The algebraic signature also contains sorts
Nonce, Label, Ciphertext, Signature and Pair for nonces, labels, ciphertexts, signa-
tures and pair, respectively. The sort Label is used in encryption and signatures
to distinguish between diﬀerent encryption/signature of the same plaintext. The
sort Term is a supersort containing all other sorts, except SKey and DKey. There
are nine operations: the four operations ek, dk, sk, vk are deﬁned on the sort ID and
return the encryption key, decryption key, signing key, and veriﬁcation key associ-
ated to the input identity. The two operations ag and adv are deﬁned on natural
numbers and return labels. As explained in the introduction, the labels are used to
diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent encryptions (and signatures) of the same plaintext,
created by the honest agents or the adversary. We distinguish between labels for
agents and for the adversary since they do not use the same randomness. The other
operations that we consider are pairing, public key encryption, and signing.
We also consider sets of sorted variables X = X.n∪X.a∪X.c∪X.s and Xl = X∪X.l.
Here, X.n,X.a,X.c,X.s,X.l are sets of variables of sort nonce, agent, ciphertext,
signature and labels, respectively. The sets of variables X.a and X.n are as follows.
If k ∈ N is some ﬁxed constant representing the number of protocol participants,
w.l.o.g. we ﬁx the set of agent variables to be X.a = {A1, A2, . . . , Ak}, and partition
the set of nonce variables, by the party that generates them. Formally: X.n =
∪A∈X.aXn(A) and Xn(A) = {X
j
A | j ∈ N}. This partition avoids to specify later, for
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each role, which variables stand for generated nonces and which variables stand for
expected nonces.
Labeled messages that are sent by participants are speciﬁed using terms in T l
L ::= X.l | ag(i) | adv(i)
T l ::= X | a | ek(a) | dk(a) | sk(a) | vk(a) | n(a, j, s)
| 〈T l , T l〉 | {T l}L
ek(a) | [T
l]L
sk(a)
where i, j, s ∈ N and a ∈ ID.
Unlabeled messages are speciﬁed similarly as terms in the algebra T deﬁned by
T ::= X | a | ek(a) | dk(a) | sk(a) | vk(a)
| n(a, j, s) | 〈T , T 〉 | {T}ek(a) | [T ]sk(a)
where j, s ∈ N and a ∈ ID.
A mapping · : T l → T from labeled to unlabeled terms is deﬁned by removing
the labels: {k}lm = {k}m, [k]
l
m = [k]m, f(t1, . . . , tn) = f(t1, . . . , tn) otherwise. The
mapping function is extended to sets of terms as expected.
The individual behavior of each protocol participant is deﬁned by a role that
describes a sequence of message receptions/transmissions. A k-party protocol is
given by k such roles.
Deﬁnition 2.1 [Labeled roles and protocols] The set Rolesl of roles for labeled
protocol participants is deﬁned by Rolesl = (({init} ∪ T l) × (T l ∪ {stop}))∗. A k-
party labeled protocol is a mapping Π : [k] → Rolesl, where [k] denotes the set
{1, 2, . . . , k}.
Unlabeled roles and protocols are deﬁned very similarly. The mapping function
is extended from labeled protocols to unlabeled protocols as expected.
We assume that a protocol speciﬁcation is such that Π(j) = ((lj1, r
j
1), (l
j
2, r
j
2), . . .),
the j’th role in the deﬁnition of the protocol being executed by player Aj. Each
sequence ((l1, r1), (l2, r2), . . .) ∈ Roles
l speciﬁes the messages to be sent/received
by the party executing the role: at step i, the party expects to receive a message
conforming to li and returns message ri. We wish to emphasize that terms l
j
i , r
j
i are
not actual messages, but specify how the message that is received and the message
that is output should look like.
Example 2.2 The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol [7] is speciﬁed as follows:
there are two roles Π(1) and Π(2) corresponding to the sender’s and receiver’s role.
A → B : {Na, A}ek(B)
B → A : {Na, Nb, B}ek(A)
A → B : {Nb}ek(B)
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Π(1) = (init, {X1A1 , A1}
ag(1)
ek(A2)
), ({X1A1 ,X
1
A2
, A2}
L
ek(A1)
, {X1A2}
ag(1)
ek(A2)
)
Π(2) = ({X1A1 , A1}
L1
ek(A2)
, {X1A1 ,X
1
A2
, A2}
ag(1)
ek(A1)
), ({X1A2}
L2
ek(A2)
, stop)
Clearly, not all protocols written using the syntax above are meaningful. In
particular, some protocols might be not executable. This is actually not relevant
for our result (our theorem also holds for non executable protocols).
2.2 Execution Model
We deﬁne the execution model only for labeled protocols. The deﬁnition of the
execution model for unlabeled protocols is then straightforward.
If A is a variable or constant of sort agent, we deﬁne its knowledge by kn(A) =
{dk(A), sk(A)}∪X.n(A), i.e. an agent knows its secret decryption and signing key as
well as the nonces it generates during the execution. The formal execution model
is a state transition system. A global state of the system is given by (SId, f,H)
where H is a set of terms of T l representing the messages sent on the network and f
maintains the local states of all session ids SId. We represent session ids as tuples of
the form (n, j, (a1, a2, . . . , ak)) ∈ (N × N × ID
k), where n ∈ N identiﬁes the session,
a1, a2, . . . , ak are the identities of the parties that are involved in the session and
j is the index of the role that is executed in this session. Mathematically, f is a
function f : SId → ([X → T l] × N × N), where f(sid) = (σ, i, p) is the local state
of session sid. The function σ is a partial instantiation of the variables occurring
in role Π(i) and p ∈ N is the control point of the program. Three transitions are
allowed.
• (SId, f,H)
corrupt(a1,...,al)
−−−−−−−−−−−→ (SId, f,∪1≤j≤lkn(aj) ∪ H). The adversary corrupts
parties by outputting a set of identities. He receives in return the secret keys
corresponding to the identities. It happens only once at the beginning of the
execution. We focus on static corruption because the soundness result using
explicit labels in [4] only considers this kind of corruption. However, in our formal
context, our reduction result should be easily extended to the case of adaptive
corruption (when agents are corrupted at any time during the execution) since
we can map traces with dynamic corruption to traces where all corrupted agents
are so at the beginning.
• The adversary can initiate new sessions: (SId, f,H)
new(i,a1,...,ak)
−−−−−−−−−→ (SId′, f ′,H ′)
where H ′, f ′ and SId′ are deﬁned as follows. Let s = |SId| + 1, be the session
identiﬁer of the new session, where |SId| denotes the cardinality of SId. H ′ is
deﬁned by H ′ = H and SId′ = SId ∪ {(s, i, (a1, . . . , ak))}. The function f
′ is
deﬁned as follows.
· f ′(sid) = f(sid) for every sid ∈ SId.
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m ∈ S
S l m
b ∈ X.a
S l b, ek(b), vk(b) Initial knowledge
S l m1 S 
l m2
S l 〈m1 ,m2〉
S l 〈m1 ,m2〉
i ∈ {1, 2}
S l mi
Pairing and un-
pairing
S l ek(b) S l m
i ∈ N
S l {m}
adv(i)
ek(b)
S l {m}lek(b) S 
l dk(b)
S l m
Encryption and
decryption
S l sk(b) S l m
i ∈ N
S l [m]
adv(i)
sk(b)
S l [m]lsk(b)
S l m
Signature
Fig. 1. Deduction rules.
· f ′(s, i, (a1, . . . , ak)) = (σ, i, 1) where σ is a partial function σ : X→ T
l and:
⎧⎨
⎩
σ(Aj) = aj 1 ≤ j ≤ k
σ(XjAi) = n(ai, j, s) j ∈ N
We recall that the principal executing the role Π(i) is represented by Ai thus, in
that role, every variable of the form XjAi represents a nonce generated by Ai.
• The adversary can send messages: (SId, f,H)
send(sid,m)
−−−−−−−→ (SId, f ′,H ′) where sid ∈
SId, m ∈ T l, H ′, and f ′ are deﬁned as follows. We deﬁne f ′(sid′) = f(sid′) for
every sid′ 
= sid. We denote Π(j) = ((lj1, r
j
1), . . . , (l
j
kj
, rjkj)). f(sid) = (σ, j, p) for
some σ, j, p. There are two cases.
· Either there exists a most general uniﬁer θ of m and ljpσ. Then f ′(sid) =
(σ ∪ θ, j, p + 1) and H ′ = H ∪ {rjpσθ}.
· Or we deﬁne f ′(sid) = f(sid) and H ′ = H (the state remains unchanged).
If we denote by SID = N×N× IDk the set of all sessions ids, the set of symbolic exe-
cution traces is SymbTrl=(SID×(SID→([X→T l]×N×N))×2T
l
)∗. The set of corre-
sponding unlabeled symbolic execution traces is denoted by SymbTr. The mapping
function · is extended as follows: if tr = (SId0, f0,H0), . . . , (SIdn, fn,Hn) is a trace
of SymbTrl, tr = (SId0, f0,H0), . . . , (SIdn, fn,Hn) ∈ SymbTr where SIdi simply equal
SIdi and fi : SID→ ([X→T ]×N×N)) with fi(sid) = (σ, i, p) if fi(sid) = (σ, i, p) and
σ(X) = σ(X).
The adversary intercepts messages between honest participants and computes
new messages using the deduction relation l deﬁned in Figure 1. Intuitively, S l m
means that the adversary is able to compute the message m from the set of messages
S. All deduction rules are rather standard with the exception of the last one: The
last rule states that the adversary can recover the corresponding message out of a
given signature. This rule reﬂects capabilities that do not contradict the standard
computational security deﬁnition of digital signatures, may potentially be available
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to computational adversaries and are important for the soundness result of [4].
Next, we sketch the execution model for unlabeled protocols. As above, the
execution is based on a deduction relation  that captures adversarial capabilities.
The deduction rules that deﬁne  are obtained from those of l (Figure 1) as follows.
The sets of rules Initial knowledge and Pairing and unpairing in are kept unchanged
(replacing l by , of course). For encryption and signatures we suppress the labels
adv(i) and l in the encryption function { } and the signature function [ ] for rules
Encryption and decryption and rules Signature. That is, the rules for encryption
are:
S  ek(b) S  m
S  {m}ek(b)
S  {m}ek(b) S  dk(b)
S  m
and those for signatures are:
S  sk(b) S  m
S  [m]sk(b)
S  [m]sk(b)
S  m
We use the deduction relations to characterize the set of valid execution traces.
We say that the trace (SId1, f1,H1), . . . , (SIdn, fn,Hn) is valid if the messages sent
by the adversary can be computed by Dolev-Yao operations. More precisely, we
require that in a valid trace whenever (SIdi, fi,Hi)
send(s,m)
−−−−−−→ (SIdi+1, fi+1,Hi+1),
we have Hi 
l m. Given a protocol Π, the set of valid symbolic execution traces
is denoted by Exec(Π). The set Exec(Π) of execution traces in the model without
labels is deﬁned similarly. We thus require that every sent message m′ satisﬁes
Hi  m
′.
Example 2.3 Playing with the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol described in
Example 2.2, an adversary can corrupt an agent a3, start a new session for the
second role with players a1, a2 and send the message {n(a3, 1, 1), a1}
adv(1)
ek(a2)
to the
player of the second role. The corresponding valid trace execution is:
(∅, f1, ∅)
corrupt(a3)
−−−−−−−−→ (∅, f1,kn(a3))
new(2,a1,a2)
−−−−−−−−→
({sid1}, f2,kn(a3))
send(sid1,{n3,a1}
adv(1)
ek(a2)
)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→(
{sid1}, f3,kn(a3) ∪ {{n3, n2, a2}
ag(1)
ek(a1)
}
)
,
where sid1 = (1, 2, (a1, a2)), n2 = n(a2, 1, 1), n3 = n(a3, 1, 1), and f2, f3 are deﬁned
as follows: f2(sid1) = (σ1, 2, 1), f3(sid1) = (σ2, 2, 2) where σ1(A1) = a1, σ1(A2) = a2,
σ1(X
1
A2
) = n2, and σ2 extends σ1 by σ2(X
1
A1
) = n3 and σ2(L1) = adv(1).
2.3 Relating the labeled and unlabeled execution models
The following lemma (which can be easily proved by structural induction) states
that, whenever a message is deducible, the corresponding unlabeled message is also
deducible.
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Lemma 2.4 S l m ⇒ S  m
Based on the above property we show that whenever a trace corresponds to an
execution of a protocol, the corresponding unlabeled trace corresponds also to an
execution of the corresponding unlabeled protocol.
Lemma 2.5 tr ∈ Exec(Π) ⇒ tr ∈ Exec(Π).
Proof The key argument is that only pattern matching is performed in protocols
and when a term with labels matches some pattern, the unlabeled term matches
the corresponding unlabeled pattern. The proof is done by induction on the length
of the trace. Full details are provided in Appendix A. 
3 A logic for security properties
In this section we deﬁne a logic for specifying security properties. We then show
that the logic is quite expressive and, in particular, it can be used to specify rather
standard secrecy and authenticity properties.
3.1 Preliminary deﬁnitions
We deﬁne the set of local states LSi,p(tr) of a trace tr for role i at step p by
LSi,p((SIdk, fk,Hk)1≤k≤n) = {(σ, i, p) | ∃s ∈ SIdk, s.t. fk(s) = (σ, i, p), 1 ≤ k ≤ n}.
We assume an inﬁnite set Sub of meta-variables for substitutions. Our logic
contains tests between terms with variables substituted by variable substitutions.
More formally, let T lSub be the algebra deﬁned by:
L ::= ς(xl) | ag(i) | adv(j)
T lSub ::= ς(x) | a | ek(a) | dk(a) | sk(a) | vk(a) | n(a, j, s)
| 〈T lSub , T
l
Sub〉 | {T
l
Sub}
L
ek(a) | [T
l
Sub ]
L
sk(a)
where xl ∈ X.l, ς ∈ Sub, i, j ∈ N, x ∈ X, a ∈ ID. The unlabeled algebra TSub is
deﬁned accordingly. The mapping function between the two algebras is deﬁned by:
ς(x) = ς(x), {k}lm = {k}m, [k]
l
m = [k]m, f(t1, . . . , tn) = f(t1, . . . , tn) otherwise.
3.2 Security Logic
In this section we describe a logic for security properties. Besides standard propo-
sitional connectors, the logic has a predicate to specify honest agents, equality tests
between terms, and existential and universal quantiﬁers over the local states of
agents.
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[[NC(tr, t)]] =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if t ∈ ID and t does not appear in a cor-
rupt action, i.e. tr = e1, e2, ..., en and
∀a1, . . . , ak, s.t. e1
corrupt(a1,...,ak)
−−−−−−−−−−−→ e2, t 
= ai,
0 otherwise
[[∀LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr)]] =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 if ∀(θ, i, p) ∈ LSi,p(tr), we have
[[F (tr)[θ/ς]]] = 1,
0 otherwise.
[[∃LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr)]] =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if ∃(θ, i, p) ∈ LSi,p(tr), s.t. [[F (tr)[θ/ς]]] = 1,
0 otherwise.
Fig. 2. Interpretation.
Deﬁnition 3.1 The formulas of the logic Ll1 are deﬁned by induction as follows:
F (tr) ::= NC(tr, t1) | (t1 = t2) | ¬F (tr) | F (tr) ∧ F (tr) | F (tr) ∨ F (tr)
| ∀LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr) | ∃LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr)
where tr is a parameter of the formula, i, p ∈ N, ς ∈ Sub, t1 and t2 are terms of
T lSub . Note that formulas are parametrized by a trace tr. As usual, we may use
φ1 → φ2 as a shortcut for ¬φ1 ∨ φ2.
We similarly deﬁne the corresponding unlabeled logic L1: the tests (t1 = t2) are
between unlabeled terms t1, t2 over Tsub . The mapping function · is extended as ex-
pected. In particular NC(tr, t) = NC(tr, t), (t1 = t2) = (t1 = t2), ∀LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr)
= ∀LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr) and ∃LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr) = ∃LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr).
Here the predicate NC(tr, t) of arity 2 is used to specify non corrupted agents.
The quantiﬁcations ∀LSi,p(tr).ς and ∃LSi,p(tr).ς are over local states of agent i
at step p in trace tr. The semantics of our logic is deﬁned for closed formula as
follows: standard propositional connectors and negation are interpreted as usual.
Equality is syntactic equality. The interpretation of quantiﬁers and the predicate
NC is shown in Figure 2.
Next we deﬁne when a protocol Π satisﬁes a formula φ ∈ Ll1. The deﬁnition for
the unlabeled execution model is obtained straightforwardly. Informally, a protocol
Π satisﬁes φ(tr) if φ(tr) is true for all traces of Π. Formally:
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let φ(tr) be a formula and Π be a protocol. We say that Π satisﬁes
security property φ, and write Π |= φ if for any trace tr ∈ Exec(Π), [[φ(tr)]] = 1.
Abusing notation, we occasionally write φ for the set {tr | [[φ(tr)]] = 1}. Then,
Π |= φ precisely when Exec(Π) ⊆ φ.
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3.3 Examples of security properties
In this section we exemplify the use of the logic by specifying secrecy and authen-
ticity properties.
3.3.1 A secrecy property
Let Π(1) and Π(2) be the sender’s and receiver’s role of a two-party protocol. To
specify our secrecy property we use a standard encoding. Namely, we add a third
role to the protocol, Π(3) = (X1A3 , stop), which can be seen as some sort of witness.
Informally, the deﬁnition of the secrecy property Ps states that, for two non
corrupted agents a1 and a2, where a1 plays role Π(1) and a2 plays role Π(2), a third
agent playing role Π(3) cannot gain any knowledge on nonce X1A1 sent by role Π(1)
(played by A1), when A1 is honest and is talking with an honest agent A2.
φs(tr) = ∀LS1,1(tr).ς ∀LS3,2(tr).ς
′
[NC(tr, ς(A1)) ∧NC(tr, ς(A2)) → ¬(ς
′(X1A3) = ς(X
1
A2
))]
3.3.2 An authentication property
Consider a two role protocol, such that role 1 ﬁnishes its execution after n steps
and role 2 ﬁnishes its execution after p steps. For this kind of protocols we give a
variant of the week agreement property [9]. Informally, this property states that
whenever an instantiation of role 2 ﬁnishes, there exists an instantiation of role 1
that has ﬁnished and they agree on some value for some variable and they have
indeed talked to each other. In our example we choose this variable to be X1A1 .
Note that we capture that some agent has ﬁnished its execution by quantifying
appropriately over the local states of that agent. More precisely, we quantify only
over the states where it indeed has ﬁnished its execution.
φa(tr) = ∀LS2,p(tr).ς ∃LS1,n(tr).ς
′ [NC(tr, ς(A1)) ∧NC(tr, ς
′(A2)) →
(ς(X1A1) = ς
′(X1A1)) ∧ (ς(A2) = ς
′(A2)) ∧ (ς(A1) = ς
′(A1))]
Notice that although in its current version our logic is not powerful enough to
specify stronger versions of agreement (like injective or bijective agreement), it could
be appropriately extended to deal with this more complex forms of authentication.
4 Main Result
Recall that our goal is to prove that Π |= φ ⇒ Π |= φ. However, as explained in the
introduction this property does not hold in general. The following example sheds
some light on the reasons that cause the desired implication to fail.
Example 4.1 Consider the ﬁrst step of some protocol where A sends a message
to B where some part is intended for some third agent.
A → B : {Na, {Na}ek(C), {Na}ek(C)}ek(B)
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The speciﬁcation of the roles of A and B that corresponds to this ﬁrst step is as
follows (in the deﬁnition below C1A2 and C
2
A2
are variables of sort ciphertext).
Π(1) = (init, {〈X1A1 , 〈{X
1
A1
}
ag(1)
ek(A3)
, {X1A1}
ag(2)
ek(A3)
〉〉}
ag(3)
ek(A2)
)
Π(2) = ({〈X1A1 , 〈C
1
A2
, C2A2〉〉}
L
ek(A2)
, stop)
We assume that A generates twice the message {Na}ek(C). Notice that we stop
the execution of B after it receives the ﬁrst message since this is suﬃcient for our
purpose, but its execution might be continued to form a more realistic example.
Consider the security property φ1 that states that if A and B agree on the nonce
X1A1 then B should have received twice the same ciphertext.
φ1(tr) = ∀LS1,2(tr).ς ∀LS2,2(tr).ς
′
NC(tr, ς(A1)) ∧NC(tr, ς(A2))∧
(ς(X1A1) = ς
′(X1A1)) → (ς
′(C1A2) = ς
′(C2A2))
This property clearly does not hold for any normal execution of the labeled protocol
since A always sends ciphertexts with distinct labels. Thus Π 
|= φ1.
On the other hand, one can show that we have Π |= φ1 in the unlabeled execution
model. Intuitively, this holds because if A and B are honest agents and agree on
X1A1 , then the message received by B has been emitted by A and thus should contain
identical ciphertexts (after having removed their labels).
4.1 Logic Ll2
The counterexample above relies on the fact that two ciphertexts that are equal in
the model without labels may have been derived from distinct ciphertexts in the
model with labels. Hence, it may be the case that although t1 
= t2 ⇒ t1 
= t2, the
contra-positive implication t1 = t2 ⇒ t1 = t2 does not hold, which in turn entails
that formulas that contain equality tests between ciphertexts may be true in the
model without labels, but false in the model with labels. In this section we identify
a fragment of Ll1, which we call L
l
2 where such tests are prohibited. Formally, we
avoid equality tests between arbitrary terms by forbidding arbitrary negation over
formulas and allowing equality tests only between simple terms.
Deﬁnition 4.2 A term t is said simple if t = ς(x) where x ∈ X.a∪X.n and ς ∈ Sub,
or t = a for some a ∈ ID or t = n(a, j, s) for some a ∈ ID, j, s ∈ N.
An important observation is that for any simple term t it holds that t = t.
Deﬁnition 4.3 The formulas of the logic Ll2 are deﬁned as follows:
F (tr) ::= NC(tr, t1) | ¬NC(tr, t1) | F (tr) ∧ F (tr) | F (tr) ∨ F (tr) | (t1 
= t2)
| (u1 = u2) | ∀LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr) | ∃LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr),
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where tr ∈ SymbTr is a parameter, i, p ∈ N, t1, t2 ∈ T
l
Sub and u1, u2 are simple
terms.
Since simple terms also belong to T lSub , both equality and inequality tests are
allowed between simple terms.
The corresponding unlabeled logic L2 is deﬁned as expected. Note that L
l
2 ⊂ L
l
1
and L2 ⊂ L1.
4.2 Theorem
Informally, our main theorem says that to verify if a protocol satisﬁes some security
formula φ in logic Ll2, it is suﬃcient to verify that the unlabeled version of the
protocol satisﬁes φ.
Theorem 4.4 Let Π be a protocol and φ ∈ Ll2, then Π |= φ ⇒ Π |= φ.
Proof Assume Π |= φ. We have to show that for any trace tr ∈ Exec(Π),
[[φ(tr)]] = 1. From Lemma 2.5 it follows that tr ∈ Exec(Π), thus [[φ(tr)]] = 1, since
Π |= φ. Thus, it is suﬃcient to show that [[φ(tr)]] = 1 ⇒ [[φ(tr)]] = 1. The following
lemma oﬀers the desired property. 
Lemma 4.5 Let φ(tr) ∈ Ll2 for some tr ∈ SymbTr, [[φ(tr)]] = 1 implies [[φ(tr)]] =
1.
Proof The proof of the lemma is by induction on the structure of φ(tr). Full
details are provided in Appendix B. 
5 Implementation and Experiments
The AVISPA project [2] provides a platform for automatic veriﬁcation of security
protocols. The platform includes a speciﬁcation language called HLPSL that can
be used for specifying both protocols and security properties. Protocols speciﬁed
in this language can be veriﬁed with four diﬀerent tools. Three of them, OFMC,
ATSE, and SATMC, use symbolic models where the number of sessions that can
be executed in parallel is bounded. The fourth tool, TA4SP, provides veriﬁcation
abilities for an unbounded number of sessions. The tools can be used to verify three
security properties: secrecy, weak authentication, and replay protection.
Based on the results of [4] and this paper, we implemented a module for the
AVISPA with the purpose of obtaining computationally sound security guarantees.
The module works as follows. First, the module veriﬁes that the protocol (speci-
ﬁed in HLPSL) can be translated in our formalism. In particular, it veriﬁes that
the protocol uses only asymmetric encryption in its pure form (that is: we do not
consider protocols that model digital signatures via decryption-with-the-private key
approach.) Notice that although we forbid protocols that encrypt messages using
symmetric keys, such keys can still be sent around. Next, the module checks whether
the security property that is veriﬁed can be translated in our L2 logic. In partic-
ular, weak authentication should only be done on atomic messages like agents and
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Public keys only symbolically secure computationally secure
13 9 9
Fig. 3. Summary of our experiments.
nonces. Finally, if the veriﬁcation succeeds the logical formula that states the secu-
rity property is printed out, together with a messages that states that the protocol
satisﬁes the security property computationally.
We executed the module on the protocols in the library of the AVISPA plat-
form. The results are summarized in Figure 3. Of the 13 public-key encryption
based protocols in the library of the AVISPA platform the tool concludes that 9 are
symbolically secure, and all 9 pass our syntactic validation tests. We conclude that
all these 9 protocols are computationally secure.
The new module will be included in the next version of the AVISPA tool.
6 Discussion
We conclude with a brief discussion of two interesting aspects of our result. First, as
mentioned in the introduction our main theorem should hold for all execution models
for which the underlying deduction systems satisfy the condition in Lemma 2.4, that
is S l m ⇒ S  m. For example, it should hold for the deduction systems obtained
after removing the rule
S l [m]lsk(b)
S l m
and its corresponding unlabeled variant. In fact, an interesting result would be to
prove a more abstract and modular version of our theorem.
Secondly, one may ask if the converse of our main theorem holds. We argue
that this is not the case. More precisely, we show that there exists a protocol Π
and a property φ such that Π |= φ but Π 
|= φ. Let Π be the protocol deﬁned
in Example 4.1. Consider a security property φ2 that states on the contrary that
whenever A and B agree on the nonce X1A1 then B should have received two distinct
ciphertexts. Formally:
φ2(tr) = ∀LS1,2(tr).ς ∀LS2,2(tr).ς
′
NC(tr, ς(A1)) ∧NC(tr, ς(A2))∧
(ς(X1A1) = ς
′(X1A1)) → (ς
′(C1A2) 
= ς
′(C2A2))
where C1A2 and C
2
A2
are variables of sort ciphertext.
This property clearly does not hold for any honest execution of the unlabeled
protocol since A always sends twice the same ciphertext, and thus Π 
|= φ2. On the
other hand however, one can show that this property holds for labeled protocols
since, if A and B are honest agents and agree on X1A1 , it means that the message
received by B has been emitted by A and thus contains two distinct ciphertexts.
Thus, Π |= φ2. We conclude that, in general, Π |= φ does not imply Π |= φ.
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A Proof of Lemma 2.5
Lemma 2.5 tr ∈ Exec(Π) ⇒ tr ∈ Exec(Π).
Proof The key argument is that only pattern matching is performed in protocols
and when a term with labels matches some pattern, the unlabeled term matches
the corresponding unlabeled pattern.
• Let tr = (SId0, f0,H0), where SId0 and H0 are empty sets. We have H0 = H0. f0
is deﬁned nowhere, and so is f0. Clearly, tr = (SId0, f0,H0) is in Exec(Π).
• Let tr ∈ Exec(Π), tr = e0, ..., en = (SId0, f0,H0), ..., (SIdn, fn,Hn), such that
tr ∈ Exec(Π). We have to show that if tr′ = tr, (SIdn+1, fn+1,Hn+1) ∈ Exec(Π),
then we have tr′ ∈ Exec(Π). There are three possible operations.
(i) corrupt(a1, ..., ak). It means that tr = (SId0, f0,H0), (SId1, f1,H1). In this case,
we have SId1 = SId0 = ∅, f1 = f0 and H1 = H0 ∪
⋃
1≤i≤k kn(ai). We can
conclude that tr = (SId0, f0,H0), (SId1, f1,H1) is in Exec(Π), because there are
no labels in H1 and f1 is still not deﬁned.
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(ii) new(i, a1, ..., ak). No labels are involved in this operation. The extension made
to fn is the same as is made to fn. Neither Hn nor Hn are modiﬁed. tr′ =
tr, (SIdn+1, fn+1,Hn+1) is a valid trace.
(iii) send(s,m).
First, we have to be sure that if m can be deduced from Hn, then m can be
deduced from Hn. This is Lemma 2.4.
Note that SIdn = SIdn+1 thus SIdn = SIdn+1. Let fn(s) = (σ, i, p) and
Π(i) = (..., (lp, rp), ...). We have two cases.
· Either there is a substitution θ with m = lpσθ. Then fn+1(s) = (σ∪θ, i, p+1).
Thus fn(s) = (σ, i, p) and fn+1(s) = (σ ∪ θ, i, p+1). By induction hypothesis,
tr is a valid trace. From m = lpσθ follows m = lpσθ. We conclude that
tr, (SIdn+1, fn+1,Hn+1) = tr′ is a valid trace, thus a member of Exec(Π).
· Or no substitution θ with m = lpσθ exists. Then tr
′ = e0, ..., en, en+1 with
en = en+1. We must show that it is always possible to construct a message
m′ ∈ T , such that there exists no substitution θ′ with m′ = lpσθ
′. Then, from
the validity of tr′ and tr we can deduce the validity of tr′, because en = en+1.
Either there exists no substitution θ′ such that m = lpσθ
′. In that case, we
choose m′ = m.
Or let θ′ be a substitution such that m = lpσθ
′. Then the matching for m
fails because of labels. This can be shown by contradiction. Assume m contain
no label, i. e. m does not contain subterms of the form {t}l
ek(ai)
or [t]l
sk(ai)
,
t ∈ T . In that case, we have m = m by deﬁnition. From m = lpσθ
′, we deduce
that m = lpσθ
′, contradiction.
We deduce that m contains some subterm of the form {t}ek(ai) or [t]sk(ai).
The fact m = lpσθ
′ implies that lp has to contain one of the following subterms:
{t′}ek(Ai), [t
′]sk(Ai) with t
′ ∈ T or, a variable of sort ciphertext or signature.
Then, we choose m′ = a for some agent identity a ∈ X.a. The term a is de-
ducible from Hn. Now, the matching of m
′ with lp always fails, either because
of the encryption or signature occurring in lp or because of type mismatch for
a variable of type ciphertext or signature in lp. 
B Proof of Lemma 4.5
Lemma 4.5 Let φ(tr) ∈ Ll2 for some tr ∈ SymbTr, [[φ(tr)]] implies [[φ(tr)]].
Proof
• φ(tr) = NC(tr, t) or φ(tr) = ¬NC(tr, t). [[NC(tr, t)]] = 1, if and only if t ∈ ID and
t does not occur in a corrupt event for the trace tr. This is equivalent to t ∈ ID
and t does not occur in a corrupt event for the trace tr. Thus [[NC(tr, t)]] = 1
if and only if [[NC(tr, t)]] = [[NC(tr, t)]] = 1.
• φ(tr) = (t1 
= t2). We have that φ(tr) = (t1 
= t2) holds. Assume by contradiction
that φ(tr) does not hold, i.e t1 = t2. This implies t1 = t2, contradiction.
• φ(tr) = (u1 = u2) with u1, u2 simple terms. We have that φ(tr) = (u1 = u2)
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holds. Since u1 and u2 are simple terms, we have ui = ui, thus u1 = u2. We
conclude that φ(tr) holds.
• The cases φ(tr) = φ1(tr)∨φ2(tr) and φ(tr) = φ1(tr)∧φ2(tr) are straightforward.
• φ(tr) = ∀LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr). If φ(tr) holds, this means that for all (θ, i, p) ∈
LSi,p(tr), [[F (tr)[θ/ς]]] = 1.
Let (θ′, i, p) ∈ LSi,p(tr). We consider [[F (tr)[θ
′/ς]]]. Since tr ∈ Exec(Π) implies
tr ∈ Exec(Π) (Lemma 2.5), we have (θ′, i, p) ∈ LSi,p(tr). By induction hypothesis,
[[F (tr)[θ′/ς]]] = 1 implies that [[F (tr)[θ′/ς]]] = 1. It follows that
∀(θ′, i, p) ∈ LSi,p(tr) [[F (tr)[θ
′/ς]]] = 1.
Thus, φ(tr) holds.
• φ(tr) = ∃LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr). If φ(tr) holds, this means that there exists (θ, i, p) ∈
LSi,p(tr), such that [[F (tr)[θ/ς]]] = 1.
By deﬁnition of the mapping function, there exists (θ′, i, p) ∈ LSi,p(tr) such
that θ′ = θ. By induction hypothesis, [[F (tr)[θ′/ς]]] = 1. Thus there exists θ′,
such that [[F (tr)[θ′/ς]]] = 1. Thus, φ(tr) holds. 
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